Freedom of Speech Large Case Paper (United States v. Alvarez)

United States v. Alvarez

Synopsis

§1.1 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. __ (2012)

§1.2 Xavier Alvarez claims that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was indicted under the Stolen Valor Act.

§1.3 In 2007, Xavier Alvarez, attended a board meeting for the Three Valley Water District Board of Directors where he made false claims about being a retired U.S. Marine and a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor. Alvaraz was convicted for his false statements under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which he claims as invalid due to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Alvarez appealed the First Amendment issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his prior conviction was reversed.

§1.4 The Court largely looks at the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), and the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 when arguing the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.

§1.5 The Court’s majority opinion argues that Alvarez’s statements, though proven as false, are still protected under the first amendment, and that Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was drafted too broadly, therefore making it invalid in attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm, guaranteed by the precedents set by Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), and New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

§1.6. The Court’s majority opinion held that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was drafted too broadly and was invalid in attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. The Court also found that criminally punishing such speech is improper, ruled in favor of Alvarez, reversed Alvarez’s prior conviction, and overtunes the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 in its entirety.

§1.7 The Court’s dissenting opinion was rhetorically stronger than the Court’s majority opinion and the Court’s concurring opinion due the structure, the strong language, and it’s attack on the Court’s judgment that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 should have been narrower and less restrictive, even when it has previously ruled on the opposite side in several similar cases such as Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987).

Explanation

§1.1.1 United States v Alvarez, 567 U.S. __ (2012)

§1.2.1 The plaintiff, Xavier Alvarez (a member of the Three Valley Water District Board of Directors), claims that the defendant, the United States, violated the rights guaranteed to him under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment rights by indicting him under the Stolen Valor Act for lying about being a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor at a board meeting.

§1.3.1 On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, an elected official of the Three Valley Water District Board of Directors, attended his first board meeting. At this meeting, Alvarez was asked to introduce himself and speak about his background. Alvarez stated that he was a U.S Marine for 25 years before retiring in 2001. He also stated that he received the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1987. Alvaraz’s statements were false. He never received the Congressional Medal of Honor or any other military medal of any kind. In fact, Alvarz had never even served in the Marine Corps or any other branch of the United States military. On September 26, 2007, Federal prosecutors charged Alvarez with two counts of violating the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. Alvarez’s lawyer moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the Stolen Valor Act was invalid under the First Amendment. The trial court denied Alvarez’s motion to dismiss, and Alavarez pleaded guilty to one count, but retained his right to appeal the case. Alvarez was tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the first to be convicted under the Stolen Valor Act. He was sentenced to probation for three years and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. Alvarez appealed the First Amendment issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the Stolen Valor law violated the First Amendment, and therefore making his prior conviction unlawful. Agreeing with Alvarez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision by a divided panel, found the Act invalid under the First Amendment and reversed the conviction.

§1.4.1 First Amendment (Free Speech Clause)

§1.4.1.1 The Free Speech Clause is included in the First Amendment. This states that Congress shall pass no law that infringes upon the freedom of speech.

§1.4.2 Stolen Valor Act of 2005

§1.4.2.1 This was a federal law, signed into effect in 2006 by President George W. Bush, that addressed the unauthorized wear, manufacture, or sale of any military decoration and medals. This criminalized false statements about having received a military medal. If convicted of violating this law, defendants may face imprisonment for up to six months, or imprisonment for up to one year if the defendant is lying about the Medal of Honor.

§1.4.3 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)

§1.4.3.1 This is about a man who was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness and attacked other forms of religion. The town marshal warned him against causing a disturbance, but his conduct resulted in him being removed by a police officer. On the way to the police station, he verbally assaulted the town marshall and was arrested. He argued that the law violated his First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague. The Court’s majority opinion holds that his insults fell into the category of “fighting words” and that the state could use its police power to curb expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality as “fighting words” are not protected under the First Amendment.

§1.4.4 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004)

§1.4.4.1 This is about Congress passing the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in order to prevent minors from accessing online pronography. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other online publishers sued in federal courts to prevent the enforcement of this act. The ACLU argues that this act violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. COPA used community standards to decide which material was and was not harmful to minors. The Court held that COPA was unconstitutionally overbroad, and that it could easily be replaced by parents using blocking software on their home computers, which would not restrict the free speech of others like COPA would.

§1.4.5 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)

§1.4.5.1 This is about the family of deceased Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder who filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The Snyder family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that read, “Thank God for dead soldiers” and “Fag troops” at the funeral. The Court held that the church members’ speech, while distatestful, was protected under the First Amendment.

§1.4.6 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

§1.4.6.1 This is about a commercial ad, published in the New York Times, that asked for donations to defend Martin Luther King Jr. on perjury charges. The ad was not fact checked and contained several minor inaccuracies. The city’s Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan felt that this criticism reflected badly on him, despite his name not being mentioned in the ad. Sullivan requested the Times to publicly retract the information presented in the ad, which was required by Alabama law in order for Sullivan to seek punitive damages as a public figure. The Times refused to retract the information, and Sullivan filed a libel action against them. The Court ruled in favor of the New York Times, based on there not being substantial proof that the ad referenced Sullivan or caused him significant damages.

§1.4.7 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987)

§1.4.7.1 This is about the San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFFA), promoting the “Gay Olympic Games” on its letterheads and mailings in local newspapers. The SFAA later claimed that the word “Olympic” was intended to make a political statement about the status of hmoseuals in society. However, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) requested the discontinuation of this use of the word “Olympic”, which the SFAA ignored. The USOC filed a lawsuit against the SFAA for violating the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which provides that the word “Olympic” cannot be used for commercial or promotional uses without the consent of the USOC. The Court held that the USOC has the exclusive use of the word “Olympic.”

§1.5.1 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 applies to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any person. However, there was no link shown between the Act’s imposed restrictions and the injury to be prevented, despite it being required by the First Amendment to be shown in court. Justice Kennedy also points out that when the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, its restriction must be the least restrictive as possible, which in this case it is not.

§1.5.2 The false statements made by Alvarez, while distasteful, were not made in order to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the Medal, and are therefore not excluded from the First Amendment’s protection.

§1.5.3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was drafted too broadly and was invalid in attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Thus, criminally punishing such speech would be improper, resulting in the Court to rule in favor of Alvarez and and overtune the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 in its entirety.

§1.6.1 Majority Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was held by Justice Kennedy, and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy recognizes that the false statements made by Alvarez are not excluded from the First Amendment’s protection. Justice Kennedy recognizes that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 applies to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any person. Justice Kennedy also argues that there is no link shown between the Act’s imposed restrictions and the injury to be prevented, though it is required by the First Amendment to be shown. Justice Kenned recognizes that Alvarez’s statement was false, with no room to argue otherwise, but Alvarez’s statements don’t seem to have been made in order to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the Medal. Justice Kennedy also points out that when the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, its restriction must be the least restrictive as possible, which in this case it is not. The Court even provides a way for the Act to be less restrictive by suggesting the Government create a database of Medal winners that is accessible/searchable on the internet. Overall, the Court’s majority opinion holds that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was drafted too broadly and was invalid in attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. The Court also found that criminally punishing such speech is improper, ruled in favor of Alvarez, reversed Alvarez’s prior conviction, and overtunes the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 in its entirety.

§1.6.2 Concurring Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was concurred by Justice Breyer, and was joined by Justice Kagan. In the concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agrees with the Court’s majority opinion that the STolen Valor Act of 2005 was unconstitutional. However, Justice Breyer disagrees with Justice Kennedy on the grounds of why the act was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer based his opinion on a proportionality/intermediate scrutiny test rather than a strict scrutiny test. Justice Breyer concluded that because the act, as presently drafted, works disproportionate constitutional harm, it fails the proportionality/intermediate scrutiny test and thus, violates the First Amendment. Justice Breyer also recognizes that there are several statutes that make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful, but those tend to be narrower than the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 because they limit the scope of their application. Justice Breyer states that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 has a very broad range, which means it creates a significant risk of the First Amendment. While Justice Breyer concurs with the Court’s majority opinion, he still believes that the statute has substantial justification and could work in reducing the threat of First Amendment harm while still permitting the statute to achieve its objective, if it was just more finely tailored.

§1.6.3 Dissenting Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was dissent by Justice Alito, and was joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Alito argues that the Stolen Valor Act, whose purpose is to protect the military awards system, could not be drafted more narrowly or it would no longer be able to prevent the substantial harm which is caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Alito argues that the Court’s majority opinion, which held that the First Amendment shields lies about military decorations, breaks from a long line of cases recognizing the right to free speech does not protect false factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no legitimate interest. Justice Alito recognizes that there are five significant aspects that limit this statues which are as follows: 1) The Act applies to only a narrow category of false representations about objective facts that can almost always be proved or disproved with near certainty; 2) The Act concerns facts that are squarely within the speaker’s personal knowledge; 3) A conviction under the Act requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker actually knew that the representations was false; 4) The Act applies only to statements that could reasonably be interpreted as communicating actual facts, it does not reach dramatic performances, satire, parody, hyperbole, or the like; and 5) The Act is strictly viewpoint neutral. Furthermore, Justice Alito argues that the proliferation of false claims about military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by making them seem more common than they really are, and by debasing the distinctive honor of military awards.

§1.7.1 I think that the Court’s dissenting opinion was rhetorically stronger than the Court’s majority opinion. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Alito strategically opens his opinion by stating that “Only the bravest of the brave are awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, but the Court today holds that every American has a constitutional right to claim to have received this singular award. The Court strikes down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which was enacted to stem an epidemic of false claims about military decorations.”

§1.7.1.1 This was a bold move to blatantly call out the Court in their opening statement. Justice Alito basically implies that by overturning the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, the Court is saying that it is not a crime to falsely claim to receive this award and that every American, whether they have earned it or not, have the right to claim to have received this award.

§1.7.2 Justice Alito also points out that Congress made it a federal offense for anyone to wear, manufacture, or sell certain military decorations without authorization, which also makes it a crime to wear a United States military uniform without authorization. Justice Alito also points out that there are other statues that make it a crime to falsely represent “that one is speaking on behalf of, or with the approval of, the Federal Government. (making it a crime to falsely impersonate a federal officer); (making it a crime to knowingly use, without authorization, the names of enumerated federal agencies, such as ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that a communication is approved or authorized by the agency). We have recognized that §912, like §1001, does not require a showing of pecuniary or property loss and that its purpose is to “‘maintain the general good repute and dignity’” of Government service. These examples amply demonstrate that false state- ments of fact merit no First Amendment protection in their own right.” Justice Alito, in turn, argues that if these are federal offenses, then how can lying about receiving military decorations and awards not also be ruled as a federal offense?

§1.7.2.1 A main argument that the Court’s majority opinion makes is that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 is too broad, and is therefore a danger to the Freedom of Speech. However, Justice Alito pointing out the facts that there is a precedent for this case, and that the Court ruled against the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 but not the others, makes the Court seem a bit hypocritical.

§1.7.3 Justice Alito further points out the explicit need for the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Justice Alito describes that the Act was passed by Congress in response to a proliferation of false claims concerning the receipt of military awards. Justice Alito even states that in a single year, more than 600 Virginia residents falsely claimed to have won the Medal of Honor. It was further shown that with an investigation of the 333 total people listed in the online edition of Who’s Who as having received a top military award, revealed that fully a third of the claims could not be substantiated. Justice Alito also states that, “When the Library of Congress compiled oral histories for its Veterans History Project, 24 of the 49 individuals who identified themselves as Medal of Honor recipients had not actually received that award.The same was true of 32 individuals who claimed to have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and 14 who claimed to have won the Navy Cross. Notorious cases brought to Congress’ attention included the case of a judge who falsely claimed to have been awarded two Medals of Honor and displayed counterfeit medals in his courtroom, a television network’s military consultant who falsely claimed that he had received the Silver Star, and a former judge advocate in the Marine Corps who lied about receiving the Bronze Star and a Purple Heart.” Justice Alito then provided accounts on how individuals who had actually received these awards felt by these false statements. He states, “Individuals often falsely represent themselves as award recipients in order to obtain financial or other material rewards, such as lucrative contracts and government benefits. An investigation of false claims in a single region of the United States, for example, revealed that 12 men had defrauded the Department of Veterans Affairs out of more than $1.4 million in veteran’s benefits.11 In other cases, the harm is less tangible, but nonetheless significant. The lies prescribed by the Stolen Valor Act tend to debase the distinctive honor of military awards. And legitimate award recipients and their families have expressed the harm they endure when an imposter takes credit for heroic actions that he never performed. One

Medal of Honor recipient described the feeling as a “‘slap in the face of veterans who have paid the price and earned their medals.’”

§1.7.3.1 This is another direct jab at the Court’s majority opinion by providing a context as to why this statute was created and is still needed. Furthermore, it does describe how harm is done to individuals who received the awards and to the degree of which recipients of these awards are held to a higher standard for their brave acts.

§1.7.4. Justice Alito also states that Justice Breyer proposes narrowing the statue so that it covers a shorter list of military awards and is less broad. However, Justice Breyer “does not provide a hint about where he thinks the line must be drawn. Perhaps he expects Congress to keep trying until it eventually passes a law that draws the line in just the right place.”

§1.7.4.1 This was also a strategic move because Justice Alito seems to be mocking Justice Breyer and the Court’s majority opinion in entirety, since it was mainly based on how the statue was too broad and could possibly work if it is narrowed down, but there are vague themselves in describing how to narrow the statue down.

§1.7.5. The Court’s majority opinon uses the Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) to help argue its opinion. The Court’s dissenting opinion uses the New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) to argue its opinion.

§1.7.5.1 The Court’s majority opinion used Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) to help its opinion. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) was used to help provide a precedent that even though what Alvarex said was a distasteful lie, it is still protected under the First Amendment. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) was used to help provide a precedent that the Act was overbroad and could easily be made less restrictive on speech by creating a database. Those two cases do make sense as to why they were used. However, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) does not make sense as it ruled that the USOC had the exclusive use of the word “Olympic”, seeming like it would help the dissent rather than the majority opinion to me. The Court;s dissenting opinion used Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) to help its opinion. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) was used to help provide a precedent where the government could curb expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.