Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing
Synopsis
§1.1 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
§1.2 Arch R. Everson claims that the First Amendment and the New Jersey state’s constitution were violated by the Board of Education of the Township of Ewing and a New Jersey law, which indirectly provided aid to religion.
§1.3 A New Jersey law authorized the reimbursement of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools (which were majorly parochial Catholic schools). Arch Everson filed a lawsuit against the Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, claiming that this law violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment.
§1.4 The Court largely looks at the Judd v. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 2, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938); Smith v. Donahue, 202 A.D. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942); Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (La. 1929); Adams v. St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (Md. 1942); James Madison's “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments”; and Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” when arguing its majority and dissenting opinions.
§1.5 The Court’s Majority opinion argues that the law did not violate the Constitution because it does not directly aid the parochial school or a particualr relgion, but rather aids the children themselves, as is the purpose of the law. Justice Black provides several example of similar cases, ruled on prior to this case, that discuss the same subject and ruled in the same manner, deciding that the children themselves are the ones being aided not the parochial schools or religion. These cases (See §1.4) stem from various states, but all dicsuss the same topic of either transportation or textbooks being provided to students in public and parochial schools.
§1.6 In a 5-4 vote, the Court’s majority opinion held that the New Jersey law did not violate the Constitution because it did not directly pay money to parochial schools or directly support them in any way. The Court’s majority opinion held that the law’s intention was to assist parents of all religions in getting their children to school, whether that school is private, public, or religious.
§1.7 The Court’s majority opinion is rheotically stronger than the two dissenting opinions due to its strategic way of focusing on the students and the school as indivduals rather than the students and the school as one. The Court, similar to the cases it references (See §1.4) argues that the students and not the schools are the ones being aided by this law, thus making it constitutional. It is also a very strategic move on the Court’s part to introduce James Madison's “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” and Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” into the argument.
Explanation
§1.1.1 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
§1.2.1 The plaintiff, Arch Everson, claims that the defendant, the Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, violated New Jersey’s state constitution, the First Amendment, and the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment by indirectly aiding religion when providing reimbursements for the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private and Catholic parochial schools.
§1.3.1 A New Jersey taxpayer, Arch R. Everson, brought a lawsuit against the Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, a tax-funded school district, that (per a New Jersey law) authorized reimbursements to parents whose children are enrolled in public or private schools and take the public transportation system to school. These reimbursements were made to the parents to compensate for the money that they had to spend for their children to ride buses, operated by the public transportation system, to get to school. Part of this allocated reimbursement money was given to parents who had children enrolled in Catholic parochial schools. These church schools give their students, in addition to secular education, regular religious instruction conforming to the religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith, and the superintendent of these schools is a Catholic priest. Everson claimed that a reimbursement given to parents who had children attending private religious schools (based off the fact that 96% of private schools benefiting from this law were parochial Catholic schools) violated the constitutional prohibition against a state’s support of religion. Everson also claimed that the use of taxpayer funds to reimburse these parents violated the Due Process Clause.
§1.4.1 First Amendment
§1.4.1.1 This guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, the right to petition, the right to assemble peacefully, and the right to petition the government. It prohibits Congress from 1) promoting one religion over others; 2) restricting an individual’s religious practices; and 3) restricting the press or the rights of individuals to speak freely
§1.4.1.2 The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” It forbids the government from establishing an official religion, and also prohibits government actions that unduly favor one religion over another. It also prohibits the government from unduly preferring religion over non-religion, or non-religion over religion.
§1.4.2 Fourteenth Amendment
§1.4.2.1 This states that no state shall make/enforce any law that will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
§1.4.2.2 The Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government except as authorized by law. These clauses are interpreted broadly in order to provide the following protections: 1) procedural due process; 2) substantive due process; 3) a prohibition against vague laws; and 4) as the vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
§1.4.3 Judd v. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 2, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938)
§1.4.3.1 This was heard in the Court of Appeals in the State of New York, and was about a group of residents/taxpayers in the Union Free School District No. 2 who were trying to restrain the Board of Education from using public funds to furnish transportation for children to go to and from any private/parochial school within the district and to compel the cancellation and removal of the assessment, levy and lien on their property for money appropriated for that purpose. The plaintiffs claim that section 206 of the Education Law (from the Laws of 1936, ch 541) appears to claim/authorize the use of public funds for the transportation of students to and from private schools or schools wholly or in part under the control/direction of any religious denomination or in which denominational tenets/doctrines are taught. They claim that this section is in vioaltion of article IX of the State Constitution and that the action taken thereunder by the defendant is void.
§1.4.3.2 Section 206 of the Education Law states that anytime a district has contracted with the school authorities of any city (or other school) district for the education for the students residing in that school district or anytime any school district children of school age reside so remotely from the school therin or the school they legally attend that they are deprived of school advantages during any portion of the school year, the inhabitants thereof are entitled to authorize to provide (by tax or otherwise) for the conveyance of any or all students residing. They may also may, if necessary, use any portion of the public money apportioned to such district.
§1.4.3.3 Article IX of the New York Constitution states that it is mandatory for Legislature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this State may be educated." Under this provision, the schools provided must be sufficiently numerous so that all the children of the State may receive their education, whatever may be their race, creed, color, or condition. Private, denominational and sectarian schools, and schools or institutions of learning in which denominational tenets or doctrines are taught or those wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination are not part of and are not within that system. Amendments designed to bring such schools into the system of common schools were discarded by the convention which framed the Constitution.
§1.4.4 Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945)
§1.4.4.1 This was heard in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and was about a resident taxpayer in Fayette County who argued three things. The first was that Chapter 156 of the 1944 Acts of the General Assembly was unconstitutional and void due to violating the provisions of Sections 3,5, 26, 171, and 180 of the Constitution. The second was that the children who attend public school do so in compliance with the compulsory school attendance law while children who attend private, sectarian, or parochial schools do so by choice, which exempts them from the compulsory provisions. The third was that for the Act to be constitutional,then the transportation should only be funded to children who attend public schools but are not within walking distance of the school they attend, and only to the point where sidewalks are located at or beyond the city limits of Lexington. The Court stated that the Act is simply an exercise of police power to protect school children from inclement weather and the hazards of highway traffic. The Court also stated that despite religion being taught in the parochial schools, it does not change the purpose of the Act, nor does it mean that the Act is giving preference to one religious sect over another, nor does it compel someone to attend any place of worship. The Court ruled that the Act in question did not violate the Constitution.
§1.4.4.2 Chapter 156 of the 1944 Acts of the General Assembly states that its purpose is to promote the public welfare, comfort, health and safety by providing supplemental transportation along highways, which have no sidewalks, for children attending school in compliance with the compulsory school attendance laws. This also states that bus transportations was already furnished to children who attended public schools and could be added (with little to no additional cost) for children who attend private or parochial schools, as long as they were in compliance with the compulsory school attendance laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and would travel the same bus routes. This further states that the cost for bus transportation to the public schools is paid with school funds, but the cost for transportation to other schools can be legally paid from general funds only. Each county in the state of Kentucky may pay for transportation via general funds (which does not include any funds/taxes that were raised for educational purposes or appropriated in aid of the public schools) for any schools to benefit all students who attend school in compliance with the compulsory school attendance laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, who do not reside within reasonable walking distance of the school they attend, and where there are no sidewalks along the highway they are compelled to travel.
§1.4.5 Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930)
§1.4.5.1 This was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and was about the appropriation of money, that was derived from taxation, to the supplying of free school books for children who attended both private and public schools. The plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of the State of Louisiana, filed suit to restrain the School Board of Education and other state officials from expending any part of the severance tax fund to purchase school books or to supply them free of cost to the school children of Louisiana, under Acts No. 100 (See §1.4.8.2) and No. 143 of 1928 (§1.4.8.3). The plaintiffs claim that the legislation violated specified provisions of the constitution of Louisiana and section 4 of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff’s plea for an injunction was refused by both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The defendants argued that the private and sectarian schools were not beneficiaries of the appropriations in question, and that the students and the state of Louisiana alone were the beneficiaries of these appropriations. Following the decision of Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (La. 1929) (See §1.4.8), the Supreme Court held that these acts were not unacceptable to neither the state nor the United States Constitution.
§1.4.6 Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (La. 1929)
§1.4.6.1 This was heard in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and was about 17 citizens/taxpayers who filed suit against the Louisiana Board of Education, the state superintendent of public education, the state auditor, and the state treasurer for violating their rights with Act No. 143 of 1928, known as “The Free Text-Book Act” which appropriated the necessary funds for the purchase of text-books. The plaintiffs sought to stop the defendants from providing free school books out of their severance tax and from taking any other action under the provision of the listed statutes. The plaintiffs claim that Act No. 100 of 1928 and Act No. 143 of 1928 are unconstitutional. They claim that Act No. 100 of 1928 violates the Constitution of 1921 by attempting to draw money from the public treasury without a specific appropriation and by attempting to draw money from the public treasury for a term longer than two years. They also claim that Act No. 143 of 1928 violates the Constitution of 1921 because there is nothing in the title of the act that indicates its intentions to make appropriations for the purchase of such books and due to making appropriations for the purchase of school books for a purpose other than any allowed. The Court found that such appropriation was for the benefit of the children and resulted in the benefit of the state, thus it was not unconstitutional.
§1.4.6.2 Act No. 100 of 1928 has three sections to it. Section 1 states that the Severance Tax Fund of the State will first be devoted to supplying school books to the school children of the State of Louisiana, and then the remaining money in the Severance Tax Fund is to be transferred to the State public school funds. Section 2 states that the State Board of Education of Louisiana, with the use of the Severance Tax Fund, will provide the aforementioned school books for school children free of cost, before applying the remaining money in the Severance Tax Fund to the State public school funds. Section 3 states that this act does not apply to students who attend colleges/universities.
§1.4.6.3 Act No. 143 of 1928 is the General Appropriations Act which states that it appropriates $750,000 out of the Severance Tax Fund to be used for the purchase of free school books for the use of school children of Louisiana to be expended by the State Board of Education of Louisiana. After making the appropriations for school books, the Act provides that the balance of the Severance Tax Fund should be transferred to the current school fund..
§1.4.7 James Madison's “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments”
§1.4.7.1 This was presented to the Virginia General Assembly in 1785. It argued for complete religious liberty and argued against the government support of religion in any form. Madison’s fundamental argument was that religion “must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man,” because it depended on “the evidence contemplated by their own minds” and “cannot follow the dictates of other men.” For that reason, religious conviction was an inalienable right over which no government, including government based on majority rule, could have legitimate power. His efforts created a political climate in Virginia that enabled him to secure passage the next year of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, the first unreserved guarantee of religious liberty and full separation of church and state in U.S. history.
§1.4.8 Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom”
§1.4.8.1 This was a statement about the freedom of conscience and the principle of separation of church and state that was passed by the Virginia General Assembly on January 16, 1786. It is divided into three paragraphs. The first paragraph states that God created the mind to be free and any attempts to influence it by punishment/burthens or civili incapacitation tend to only beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness and are a departure fromYe God’s plan. The second paragraph states that no person can be compelled to attend any church or support it with his taxes. It also states that an individual is free to worship as he pleases with no discrimination. The third paragraph reflects on Jefferson’s belief in the people’s rights to change any law.
§1.5.1 The Court’s majority opinion states that a state law was passed to satisfy a public need for children to be safely transported to and from school. The Court also states that while New Jersey cannot contribute tax raised funds to support an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church and remain aligned with the "Establishment of Religion'' clause of the First Amendment; however, per the same amendment, it also cannot cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
§1.5.2 Since the same amendment states that while New Jersey can neither contribute tax raised funds to support a religious institution nor hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion, New Jersey cannot exclude the parochial schools from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation because of their faith. Thus, the transportation reimbursements were offered to all students in the district and not explicitly to those enrolled in parochial schools and were made to the parents of the students and not to any religious institution.
§1.5.3 The Court’s majority opinion held that the law did not violate the Constitution, stating that the law neither directly supported parochial schools in anyway nor directly paid money to parochial school, and the law was enacted in order to assist parents of all religions in getting their children to school, whether that school be public, private, or religious. Justice Black argues that the expenditure of the tax raised funds were authorized for a public purpose and did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
§1.6.1 Majority Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was held by Justice Black and was joined by Justice Murphy, Justice Douglas, Justice Reed, and Justice Vinson. The Court’s majority opinion held that the law did not violate the Constitution, stating that the law neither directly supported parochial schools in anyway nor directly paid money to parochial school, and the law was enacted in order to assist parents of all religions in getting their children to school, whether that school be public, private, or religious. Justice Black argues that the expenditure of the tax raised funds were authorized for a public purpose and did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black also argues that the New Jersey law did not violate the provision of the First Amendment prohibiting any law respecting an establishment of religion. Justice Black then recognizes that this law was constitutional because the reimbursements were offered to all students in the district and not explicitly to those enrolled in parochial schools, and that the reimbursements were made to the parents of the students and not to any religious institution. He then begins to define the “Establishment of Religion” clause in the First Amendment, which leads into his statement that the clause against the establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between the Church and State, which has been done by the First Amendment. Justice Black states that the fact that a state law was passed to satisfy a public need (the need for children to get transported to school), coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is not a good enough reason for the Court to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need. He also points out that New Jersey cannot contribute tax raised funds to support an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church and remain aligned with the "Establishment of Religion'' clause of the First Amendment; however, other language of the same amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Thus, New Jersey cannot exclude the parochial schools from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation because of their faith. He then notes that parents may send their children to a religious, rather than a public, school as long as the school meets the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose, and the parochial schools in question do appear to meet New Jersey's requirements. While these schools do meet New Jersey's requirements, the state does not contribute any money to the schools nor does it support them. The only thing that the State contributes to these schools is following the legislation and providing a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools. Therefore, the Court’s majority opinion holds that the legislation is not in violation of the New Jersey’s state constitution, the First Amendment, or the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
§1.6.2 Dissenting Opinion 1: The Court’s first dissenting opinion was held by Justice Jackson and was joined by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Jackson agreed with Justice Black’s definition of the Establishment Clause, but argued that the principles he laid down would lead to the invalidation of the challenged law. Justice Jackson states that the Act permits the payment for transportation to parochial schools or public schools, but prohibits it to private schools that are operated in whole or in part for profit. Children often are sent to private schools because their parents feel that they require more individual instruction than public schools can provide, or because they are backward or defective, and need special attention. If all children of the state were objects of impartial solicitude, no reason is obvious for denying transportation reimbursement to students of this class, for these often are as needy and as worthy as those who go to public or parochial schools. Therefore, under the Act they are to be aided if they attend the public schools or private Catholic schools, but they are not allowed to be aided if they attend private secular schools or private religious schools of other faiths. Overall, Justice Black argues that it cannot go both ways which means: religious teachings cannot be considered a private affair when the state seeks to impose regulations that infringe on it indirectly, but be considered a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith to aid another, or those of no faith to aid all. Justice Black then points out that while his principles may seem harsh in prohibiting aid to Catholic education, it should not be forgotten that it is the same Constitution that assures the Catholics have the right to maintain these schools at all when predominant local sentiment would forbid them.
§1.6.3 Dissenting Opinion 2: The Court’s second dissenting opinion was held by Justice Rutledge and was joined by Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson, and Jackson Burton. Justice Rutledge agreed with Justice Black’s definition of the Establishment Clause, but argued that he laid down would lead to the invalidation of the challenged law. Justice Rutledge argues that the funds used were raised by taxation and it the use of the funds very clearly gives aid and encouragement to religious instruction. Justice Rutledge then argues that the only serious threat to maintaining that a complete and permanent separation of religion and civil powers, commanded by the First Amendment, is by using the power of taxation to support religion, religious establishments, or establishments having a religious foundation, whatever their form or special religious function. Justice Rutdlege then points out that, according to the test used by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, money taken by taxation from one person is not to be used/given to support another’s religion training or belief or even one’s own religion training or belief in order to maintain a separation of church and state. Justice Rutledge then points out that our constitutional policy only secures the freedom of religious teachings, it does not, however, allow the state to undertake or sustain them in any form or degree, which is the very heart of MAdison’s Remonstrance and the First Amendment. Overall, Justice Rutldge dissented the Court’s majority opinion because he believed the case should have been decided on narrower issues.
§1.7.1 I think that the Court’s majority opinion is rheotically stronger than the two dissenting opinions and was very strategic in crafting its argument for its ruling, particularly in focusing on the individual rather than the group as a whole. Justice Black states that a state law was passed to satisfy a public need for children to be safely transported to and from school. He also explcilty points out the contradicting language of the law that states New Jersey can neither contribute tax raised funds to support a religious institution nor hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Thus, the law in question states that New Jersey cannot exclude the parochial schools from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation because of their faith.
§1.7.1.1 This was a very strategic move on Justice Black’s part becuase, in a way, it invalidates the plaintiff’s argument that the law was unconsitutitonal for providing reimbursements to children of all schools, whether they be public, private, or parochial. He points out that if reimbersumnets were provided to public schools or to private schools and not to the parochial schools, the argument could be made that the law was disrcimating against them for their faith. He makes the point that if reimbursements were only provided to some instead of all then one group argues the law prioritizes religon ove non religion or priortizies non religion over relgion. The law makes it applicable for reimbusements to be provided to all so as not to prioritize one relgiion over another.
§1.7.2 Justice Black also emphasizes that the transportation reimbursements were offered to all students in the district and not explicitly to those enrolled in parochial schools and were made to the parents of the students and not to any religious institution. Thus, Justice Black argues that the law neither directly supported parochial schools in anyway nor directly paid money to parochial school, and the law was enacted in order to assist parents of all religions in getting their children to school, whether that school be public, private, or religious. He further argues that the expenditure of the tax raised funds were authorized for a public purpose , and were used for such, therefore the law did not not violate the Constitution nor did it violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
§1.7.2.1 This was another strategic move on Justice Black’s part because he shows that no bias or religous preference is shown here in this case. The reimbursements were not offered to one party, they were offered to all students. Therefore, even though the reimbursements were given to the students of parochial schools, they were given to the children and the parents themselves, not to the schools. Therefore, the law is not aiding a religion, or prioritizing one religion over another, or prioritizing any religion over not being religious at all. The law is simply providing a public service to the students with the use of public funds that were raised to be used for a public service like this one.
§1.7.3 Justice Black states that the fact is was a state law passed to satisfy a public need, which was to get school children to easy access to transportation to school, regardless of the school they chose to attend. He further states that simply because that law happens to coincide with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is not a good enough reason for the Court to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need. Therfore, the Court held that this law is not in violation of the New Jersey’s state constitution, the First Amendment, or the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
§1.7.3.1 I think that this was a very bold move on his part, that worked in his favor. It was very bold to call out the the plaintiff’s argument, but it hit hard in making his point, which was that there was simply not enough material for this case to be considered. He makes it seem like this was an easy decision to rule on, like it was very clear cut.
§1.7.4 I also found it very strategic for Justice Black to mention the various cases that he did. For example, he briefly mentions Judd v. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 2, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938) (See §1.4.3 ); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945) (See §1.4.4); Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (See §1.4.5 ); Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (La. 1929) (See §1.4.6).
§1.7.4.1 All of these cases were similar to the one at hand. Two of these cases Judd v. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 2, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938) (See §1.4.3) and Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945) (See §1.4.4) are both about providing children safe transportation to and from school, whether that school be public, private, or parochial. Both of these cases ruled in favor of providing tranpsortation to all students, arguing the same thing that Justice Black argues, which is that the transportation is for the benefit of the children. They argue that the children and the parents of said children are the ones who are being aided/benefitted rather than the schools themselves, thus are not unconstitutional. The other two case, rather than discussing transporation, discuss the providing of free textbooks to all students. While on another subject, that is similar to the one at hand, still argues the same thing as the previous two cases and as the case at hand, which is that the children and the parents of said children are the ones who are being aided/benefitted rather than the schools themselves, thus are not unconstitutional argues that the students and not the schools are the ones being aided by this law, thus making it constitutional. It is also a very strategic move on the Court’s part to introduce James Madison's “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” and Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” into the argument.
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