Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
Synopsis §1.1 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
§1.2 The Nebraska Press Association claims that their First and Fourteenth Amendments rights were violated by a Nebraska state trial judge entering an order to restrain members of the press.
§1.3 In 1975, Hugh Stuart, a Nebraska state trial judge, was presiding over a widely publicized trial. The attorney of Erwin Simants, the accused murderer, requested that the state reduce the intensity of the reporting, fearing that it would impede on having a impartial jury and his client’s right to a fair trial. In response, Stuart entered an order that restrained the members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by Simants to the police. The Nebraska Press Association claims that Stuart’s order violated their First Fourteenth Amendment rights.
§1.4 The Court largely looks at the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) when arguing its majority and concurring opinions.
§1.5 The Court’s majority opinion held that it was unconstitutional for the judge to try to restrain an entire community from discussing something that affected it, particularly when there were various other options available to ensure that Simants would still recieve a fair trial with an impartial jury that did not enroach upon the right of freedom of the press like the judge’s order did. The Court supported is opinion by looking at prior precedents set in the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
§1.6 In a unanimous vote, the Court’s majority opinion stated that while the case would generate a lot of publicity, it was impractical to restrain an entire community from discussing something that greatly affected the community. Thus, the Court held that Judge Stuart’s order to restrain the press did violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Nebraska Press Association.
§1.7 The Court’s unanimous decision was very rhetorically sound and revolved around the idea that the judge violated the rights of the press, when there were other options avialblae that were simpler and would not violate the First Amendment rights. The Court’s opinion is also backed up by several court cases that were ruled on before this specific case, such as the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Explanation
§1.1.1 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
§1.2.1 The Nebraska Press Association filed a lawsuit against Hugh Stuart, a Nebraska state trial judge, who filed an order to restrain the press during a murder trial to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial and impartial jury. A Nebraska District Court ruled in Stuart’s favor, but the Nebraska Press Association filed an appeal in the Supreme Court, claiming that Stuart’s order was unconstitutional and violated their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States of America.
§1.3.1 In 1975, Erwin Simants was arrested and arraigned in Sutherland, Nebraska for the murders of six members of Henry Kellie’s family. The Kellie family lived in Sutherland, which was a community of only 850 people. After Simants was arrested, there was a large amount of media coverage of the criminal justice proceedings. Simants' attorney, and the prosecutor handling the case, requested that the state court system reduce the intensity of the media coverage due to a concern about selecting an impartial jury and due to a concern that the pretrial publicity could infringe on Simants' right to a fair trial. Hugh Stuart, a Nebraska state trial judge, entered an order that restrained petitioner newspapers, broadcasters, journalists, news media associations, and national newswire services from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police and other facts that were strongly implicative of the accused. The order also required members of the press to observe the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. In response to this order, several media organizations moved to have the restrictive order vacated in the District Court. The District Court granted the motion to intervene with Stuart’s order, but entered their own order. The District Court Judge found that there was a clear and present danger to Simants’ right to a fair trial due to the nature of the crimes and the pretrial publicity. The District Court’s order only applied until the jury was impaneled and specifically prohibited petitioners from reporting the following subject: (1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, which had been introduced in open court at arraignment; (2) the fact or nature of statements Simants had made to other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime; (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault. A few days later, the same media organizations moved for the District Court to stay its order and applied to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a stay, and an expedited appeal from the order. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that due to the publicity surrounding the crime, Simants’ right to a fair trial was in jeopardy. The court also noted that Nebraska statutes required the District Court to try Simants within six months of his arrest, and that a change of venue could move the trial only to adjoining counties, which had been subject to the same publicity as the current county he was in. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld Stuart’s order, but the U.S. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously ruled against Stuart’s order.
§1.4.1 First Amendment
§1.4.1.1 This guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, the right to petition, the right to assemble peacefully, and the right to petition the government. It prohibits Congress from 1) promoting one religion over others; 2) restricting an individual’s religious practices; and 3) restricting the press or the rights of individuals to speak freely
§1.4.2 Fourteenth Amendment
§1.4.2.1 This states that no state shall make/enforce any law that will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
§1.4.3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
§1.4.3.1 During the Civil Rights movement, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. on perjury charges, which contained several minor factual inaccuracies, as it was not fact checked before publication. The Montgomery Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan felt that the criticism of the Montgomery police in the ad reflected poorly on him, even though he is not mentioned by name in the ad, and filed a libel action against both the New York Times and the four African American ministers who endorsed the ad. The Court’s majority opinion held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials, with the only exception being when these statements are made with actual malice. Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the New York Times.
§1.4.4 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
§1.4.4.1 This was about Leslie Irvin who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Shortly after Irvin was arrested for six murders, the Prosecutor of Vanderburgh County and Evansville police officials issued intensely publicized press releases that stated Irvin had confessed to the murders. Irvin was granted a change of venue, but only to an adjoining county, which had been exposed to the same publicity as the original venue. At trial, 430 persons were called for jury service; 268 were excused because they had fixed opinions as to Irvin’s guilt. Eight of the twelve who had served as jurors thought Irvin was guilty, but said they could not render an impartial verdict. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that Irvin was not afforded a fair and impartial trial, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
§1.4.5 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
§1.4.5.1 This was about Wilbert Rideau who robbed a bank, kidnapped three of the bank’s employees, and killed one of the employees. Rideau was convicted with first-degree murder in the Calcasieu Parish trial court. In an interview between the sheriff and Rideua, he admittted that he perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder. This admission was broadcast over a local television station. Rideau appealed his conviction, claiming that the court had compromised his right to due process by refusing to grant him a change of venue after the people of Parish had seen and heard the filmed interview several times before Rideau’s trial. In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed Rideau’s conviction, ruling that it was against the constitution’s guarantee of due process.
§1.4.6 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)
§1.4.6.1 This was about Billie Sol Estes who was facing trial for swindling. On the trial date, a hearing commenced on Estes’ motion to prevent telecasting, radio broadcasting, and news photography. The hearing, conducted in the presence of some trial witnesses and veniremen later released, was carried live on television and radio, and news photography was permitted. The original jury panel, petitioner, counsel, and the trial judge were highly publicized during the two days that the pretrial hearing lasted. Four of the jurors selected later at the trial had seen or heard all or part of the broadcasts. The profusion of cameramen with their equipment in various parts of the crowded courtroom caused considerable disruption. The United States Supreme Court held that Estes’ was denied his right to due process as a result of the volume of trial publicity, the judge's failure to control the proceedings, and the telecast of a hearing and of the trial itself. Thus, in a 5-4 vote, Estes’ conviction was overturned.
§1.4.7 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
§1.4.7.1 This was about Samuel Sheppard, who was convicted of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife. Sheppard challenged his conviction, claiming that the trial judge failed to protect him from the prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution and led to an unfair trial. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling that supported his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Sheppard appealed again and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In an 8-1 decision, the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.
§1.5.1 The Court’s majority opinion states that the Sixth Amendment guarantees every U.S. citizen the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and that the First Amendment guarantees the freedom of the press. Justice Burger describes that these two amendments are both extremely important, and hard to maintain one without infringing upon the other. However, Justice Burger provides several examples of doing so in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). He also provides several examples of how to go about doing so in a courtroom.
§1.5.2 Since every U.S. citizen the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and the First Amendment guarantees the freedom of the press, there are limited ways to maintain both of these rights when they become entangled like in this case. Justice Burger describes various ways to protect the rights guaranteed by both the First and Sixth Amendments. For example, he states the the court could move the location of the trial to a place that was less exposed to publicity, delay the criminal proceedings until after the media attention has died down, query jurors to make certain they are impartial, issue instructions to the jury telling them to only consider the evidence presented in the trial, or sequester the jury during the proceedings. Justice Buerger then discusses how other court cases have implemented such alterantive options in their cases. For example, in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Irvin’s case was moved to an adjoining county due to the overwhelming media coverage. However, this county was privy to the same media as the original county (similar to Simants case). At the trial, 268 people called for jury service were excused for not being impartial. In this case, several attempts were made to ensure Irvin had an impartial jury and a fair trial, unlike in Simants case.
§1.5.3 The Court’s majority opinion ruled that Stuart’s order was unconstitutional, due to there being no evidence that such an extreme was required. The Court provides several alternatives that could have been explored before having to result to such extreme measures. Other than this order, which attempted to restrict the press and an entire community from discussing the case, Stuart shows no other attempts to maintain Simants Sixth Amendment rights.
§1.6.1 Majority Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was held by Justice Burger, and was joined by Justice White, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Burger argues that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment Rights. Justice Burger states that it is inappropriate to bar media reporting on a criminal case prior to the trial itself, unless there is a clear and present danger that would impede the process of a fair trial. Justice Burger also argues that the trial court could have used any number of means aside from restraining the press to ensure that Simants would have a fair trial with an impartial jury. The trial court could have moved the location of the trial to a place that was less exposed to the publicity, delayed the criminal proceedings until after the media attention had died down, querying jurors to make certain they are impartial, issue instructions to the jury telling them to only consider the evidence presented in the trial, or sequester the jury during the proceedings. Justice Burger further argues that the crime took place in a community of only 850 people and would have very likely spread by word of mouth with or without any news being printed or broadcast. With this in mind, Justice Burger concluded that a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it, and that the prior restraint on publication would not have protected Simants’ rights. Therefore, the Court’s majority opinion ruled in favor of the Nebraska Press Association and reversed the prior ruling.
§1.6.2 Concurring Opinion 1: The Court’s first concurring opinion was held by Justice White. Justice White joins the Court’s opinion, but states that there is some doubt about whether an order with respect to the press, such as in this case, would ever be justifiable. However, he does argue that it would be better not to announce a rule like that in the first case that is heard on the matter, and should wait until it is exposed to a broader spectrum of cases with similar issues.
§1.6.3 Concurring Opinion 2: The Court’s second concurring opinion was held by Justice Powell. Justice Powell argues that there are ways to issue a prior restraint properly, but only when it is necessary in preventing the impaneling of a jury. Justice Powell states that to do this, it requires for there to be a clear threat to the fairness of a trial, that such a threat is posed by the actual publicity in order for it to be restrained, and that no less restrictive alternatives are available. Therefore, Justice Powell agrees with the Court’s opinion that the prior restraint was impermissible in this case.
§1.6.4 Concurring Opinion 3: The Court’s third concurring opinion was held by Justice Brennan, and was by Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall. Justice Brennan states that the question presented by this case is whether a court may prohibit the press from reporting or commenting on information that was acquired from public court proceedings, records, or other sources about pending judicial proceedings. Justice Brennan argues that while it is an unquestionable right to have a fair trial, there are a wide array of ways that Stuart could have ensured a fair trial for Simants without resorting to restraining the press and violating their First Amendment rights. Justice Brennan then states what is and is not appropriate to disclose or report on. According to Justice Brennan, it is appropriate to disclose or report the following: 1) the arrested person’s name, age, residence, employment, and marital status; 2) what the arrested person is charged with, and, if applicable, the identity of the complainant; 3) the amount or conditions of bail; 4) the identity and biographical information of the complaining party/victim, and, if a death is involved, the apparent cause of death unless it appears to be a contested issue; 5) the identity of the investing/arresting agencies and the length of their investigation; 6) the circumstances of the arrest, including the time, place, resistance, pursuit, possession of and all weapons used, and a description of the items seized at the time of the arrest; 7) information disclosed by public records, including all testimony and other evidence cited at the trial. According to Justice Brennan, it is not appropriate to disclose or report the following: 1) the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the accused, unless it is stating that the accused denies the charges against him; 2) opinions concerning the guilt, innocence, or character of the accused; 3) statements prediction or influencing the outcome of the trial; 4) results of any examination, tests, or the accused’s refusal/failure to submit to an examination or test; 5) statements or opinions that concern the credibility or anticipated testimony of prospective witnesses; 6) statements made in the judicial proceedings outside the presence of the jury that relate to confessions or other matters which would interfere with a fair trial.
§1.6.5 Concurring Opinion 4: The Court’s fourth concurring opinion was held by Justice Stevens. Justice Steven agrees with Justice Brennan that Judge Stuart was capable of protecting Simants’ right to a fair trial without restricting the press from publishing information about the case and that he may not do so.
§1.7.1 The Court’s majority opinion was very strategic in the way it argued that the judge’s order was unconstitutional. The Court agreed that Simants, as started in the Sixth Amendment, had a right to “a trial, by an impartial jury.” However, the Court then points out similar cases (such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)) where that right was also threatened. The Court also points out that the difference between those cases, and the case being discussed, is that they chose other options that were much simpler and did not than trying to restrict the press and entire community from discussing something that greatly effected them, like the facts of Simants case. Justice Burger argues that Stuart could have easily used any number of means aside from restraining the press to ensure that Simants would have a fair trial with an impartial jury. Justice Burger even lists several examples of alternate paths that Stuart could have taken. For example, Justice Burger claims that Stuart could have 1) moved the location of the trial to a place that was less exposed to the publicity; 2) delayed the criminal proceedings until after the media attention had died down; 3) queried jurors to make certain they are impartial; 4) issued instructions to the jury telling them to only consider the evidence presented in the trial; or 5) sequestered the jury during the proceedings. Justice Burger provied all of these alternative options as a way to directly question the reasoning behind his decision to violate the freedom of press by trying to restrain them.
§1.7.1.1 I think this was a very strategic move on Justice Burger’s part. Stuart’s whole argument for issueing the order was that Simants right to a fair and impartial trial was in danger. However, other than stating that Simants could be moved to a neighboring county, (who had the same media coverage as the county he was currently in) Stuart provided no evidence of trying to maintain Simants right before immediately jumping to issuing this order. Justice Burger argues that this order, should have only been considered if all other options had been exhausted and there was still a clear and present threat to Simants right to a fair and impartial trial. Immediately, Justice Burger provided several alterantives that Stuart could have taken before restoring to the extremeness of his order, and yet Stuart did none of those things. Justice Burger effectively attacked and dismantled Stuart’s entire argument for the order.
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