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Freedom of Speech Case Summary #2 (Cohen v. California)

Writer's picture: Sara LewterSara Lewter

Cohen v. California

Synopsis


§1.1 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)

§1.2 Cohen feels that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the State of California when he was charged for disturbing the peace via offensive conduct because of his jacket that read “Fuck the Draft.”

§1.3 Cohen was seen in the Los Angeles Courthouse with a jacket that read “Fuck the Draft.” Cohen was arrested for maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace via offensive conduct. Cohen claims that the jacket’s slogan was a means of informing the public on his feelings on the Vietnam War and the draft. Cohen did not engage in any violence or make any loud noises prior to his arrest. Cohen claims that the statue infringed on his rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

§1.4 The Court largely looks at the Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) and Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) when arguing the majority and dissenting opinions.

§1.5 The Court’s majority opinion argues that, through the precedent set by Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969), there was no substantial evidence of an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance which is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression”; thus Cohen’s jacket was protected under the First Amendment.

§1.6 The majority opinion of the Court held that the State of California must have a better reason than a concern for generally disturbing the peace when they ban an expletive in a public space. The Court also held that Cohen’s jacket was considered as speech rather than expressive conduct. Therefore, the Court held that Cohen’s jacket was protected under his First Amendment rights and ruled in favor of Cohen.

§1.7 The Court’s majority opinion was rhetorically stronger than the Court’s dissenting opinion due to its structure and length, it’s attack on the lack of evidence provided, and it’s attack on the vagueness of the statute Coehn was charged with, through the use Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) and Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).

Explanation

§1.1.1 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)

§1.2.1 The plaintiff, Paul Cohen, claims that the defendant, the State of California, violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by charging him with maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace because he, expressing how he felt about the Vietnam War and the draft, wore a jacket that bore the words “Fuck the Draft” in the Los Angeles County Courthouse where women and children were present.

§1.3.1 On April 26, 1968, Cohen was observed wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in the Los Angeles County Courthouse in the presence of women and children. Cohen was arrested for violating the California Penal Code that prohibits “maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct.” In court, Cohen testified that his jacket was a way of informing the public on his feelings about the Vietnam War and the draft. Cohen did not commit or threaten to commit any acts of violence, nor did he make any loud or unusual noises prior to his arrest. Cohen was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court and sentenced to 30 days of jail time for this violation. Cohen consistently claimed that the statute infringed upon his rights to freedom of expression guaranteed to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The California state courts rejected Cohen’s claims, resulting in the case being brought before the Supreme Court.

§1.4.1 Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)

§1.4.1.1 This is about five students who wore black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. The principals of the schools implemented a policy that would require children in school to remove the armbands. If the students refused to comply, they would be suspended and sent home until they did. Three of the students were suspended for wearing the armbands in protest. The Court’s majority opinion holds that the First Amendment protections extend to students in public schools and educational authorities who wish to censor speech must show that permitting the speech would significantly interfere with the discipline needed for the school to function.

§1.4.2 Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)

§1.4.2.1 This is about a man who was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness and attacked other forms of religion. The town marshal warned him against causing a disturbance, but his conduct resulted in him being removed by a police officer. On the way to the police station, he verbally assaulted the town marshall and was arrested. He argued that the law violated his First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague. The Court’s majority opinion holds that his insults fell into the category of “fighting words” and that the state could use its police power to curb expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality as “fighting words” are not protected under the First Amendment.

§1.5.1 The initial conviction of Paul Cohen rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words used by Cohen to convey his message to the public. Cohen’s jacket is a form of speech rather than an expression of conduct. Thus, as long as there is no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, then according to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Cohen could no be punished for asserting his right to express his position on the draft via his jacket.

§1.5.2 Cohen was exercising his right to freedom of speech and freedom of expression by wearing a jacket that read “Fuck the Draft” in the Los Angeles Courthouse when he was arrested for disturbing the peace. However, there were no notices around the courthouse saying that certain kinds of speech would not be tolerated in the Courthouse. The Court also notes that no evidence of anyone being invited to violence from Cohen’s jacket. The Court also notes that while Cohen’s use of “Fuck the Draft” could be constured as distasteful, that as an American citizien he had the right “to speak foolishly and withot moderation.”

§1.5.3 Since there was no proof of Cohen’s jacket inciting others violence or proof that Cohen intended to incite others to violence, Cohen’s jacket is still protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, it is unconstitutional to convict Cohen of this vague statute for disturbing the peace at the Los Angeles County Courthouse.

§1.6.1 Majority Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was delivered by Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan was joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, and Justice Marshall. In the majority opinion, Justice Harlan argues that the slogan “Fuck the Draft” on Cohen’s jacket should be classified as speech rather than expressive conduct. Justice Harlan also argued that the slogan was not a “fighting word” because it was not directly targeted towards anyone in the vicinity of the courthouse; hence the State lacked the power to punish Cohen for the content of the slogan. Justice Harlan found that the statute Coehn was charged with, was overly vague in describing the conduct that it prohibited and that virtually any statute that criminalized the slogan on Cohen’s jacket would be unconstitutional. Overall, Justice Harlan argues that while the slogan may have been distasteful or upsetting to members of the public, it was not enough to remove the First Amendment protections and submit Cohen to criminal prosecution, especially since there was no evidence provided that Cohen’s intent was to incite violence or cause harm. The Court’s majority opinion was to reverse the initial ruling of the case, and rule that Cohen’s First Amendment rights were violated by the State of California.

§1.6.2 Dissenting Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was dissent by Justice Blackmun, and was joined by Justice Burger, Justice Black, and Justice White. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s classification of the slogan, “Fuck the Draft,” as speech rather than conduct. Justice Blackmun also recognizes that this case is similar to another Supreme Court Case (Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). Justice Blackmun interprets that this case should have fallen under the sphere of the precedent set by Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and that it was unnecessary for this case to have been heard by the Supreme Court without more consideration at the state appellate level. §1.6.3 Concurring Opinion: Justice White concurred with the second paragraph of Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion. Justice White concurred with Justice Blackmun that this case should be remanded to the California Court of Appeals for more consideration before being presented to the Supreme Court.

§1.7.1 The Court’s majority opinion opens its argument by stating how Cohen’s conviction clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public. Once this was stated, the Court provides context into the statute Cohen was charged with and provides a word for word description of what has to be proved to convict someone of this charge. Once that was established, the Court argues that there was not a sufficient amount of evidence to interpret what Cohen’s intentions were nor to say that a large percentage of individuals were affected by the slogan on Cohen’s jacket.

§1.7.1.1 I think that it was a very strategic move to open their argument with this. Right off the bat, the Court’s majority opinion clearly shows the limitations of the statute Cohen was charged with violating, and then immediately shot down why Cohen’s case does not fit the overly vague limitations of this statute. Hence, Cohen’s jacket was still protected under the First Amendment and his conviction was unconstitutional.

§1.7.2 The Court’s majority opinion was also much longer and more detailed than the Court’s dissenting opinion. The Court’s majority opinion was much more length because it went into specific detail on the context of the statute that was being discussed, detail on how it was impossible to interpret Cohen’s intent with the use of a four letter word, and detail on how his jacket was considered as speech and not as a form of conduct.

§1.7.2.1 The use of more details and more context provides a stronger basis for the forming of their opinion, whereas in the dissenting opinion we are only provided a few sentences that are immediately followed by lists of cases the reader has no prior knowledge of. At least in the majority opinion, when a case was listed there was some context or a quote given to provide some insight into how it was relevant to Cohen’s case. The majority opinion actually argues its point, whereas the dissenting opinion merely states that it disagrees and this case should never have reached the Supreme Court. An example of this is how in the Court’s majority opinion, it uses Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) as a grounding for its point that the California court’s rationale, at most, reflects an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Another example of this is how in the Court’s majority opinion, it uses Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) to help establish the context behind the statute that Cohen was charged with by saying that the States are “free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called ‘fighting words,’ those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction..” Whereas, the Court’s dissenting opinion, uses the exact same case, but only says that Cohen’s case was well within the sphere of Chaplinksy v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) without any context or explanation as to why he had that opinion.




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