New York Times Company v. Sullivan
Synopsis
§1.1 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
§1.2 L.B. Sullivan filed a libel action against the New York Times and won $500,000 in damages, which was later appealed in the Supreme Court of Alabama by the New York Times who claims that they did not defame Sullivan and that the prior ruling was a violation of both their freedom of speech and their freedom of press.
§1.3 During the Civil Rights movement, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. on perjury charges, which contained several minor factual inaccuracies, as it was not fact checked before publication. The Montgomery Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan felt that the criticism of the Montgomery police in the ad reflected poorly on him, even though he is not mentioned by name in the ad, and filed a libel action against both the New York Times and the four African American ministers who endorsed the ad.
§1.4 The Court largely looks at the Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960), Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959), and Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921), and the Sedition Act of 1798 when arguing its majority opinion.
§1.5 The Court’s majority opinion argues that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials, unless there is proof of actual malice occurring with that statement, thus Alabama’s libel is unconstitutional and violates the freedom of speech and freedom of press that are guaranteed by the First Amendment, which is shown in the precedents set by Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960), Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959), and Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921), and the Sedition Act of 1798.
§1.6 The Court’s majority opinion held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials, with the only exception being when these statements are made with actual malice. Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the New York Times.
§1.7 The Court’s majority opinion is made rhetorically strong due to its use of context on the Alabama law, its structure, and its mention of various court cases, such as Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960), Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959), and Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921), and its mention of the Sedition Act of 1798 to support its decision to rule in favor of the New York Times and reverse the $500,00 judgment.
Explanation
§1.1.1 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
§1.2.1 The plaintiff, the New York Times, claims that their freedom of speech and freedom of press were violated by the State of Alabama for ruling in favor of Sullivan (and awarding him $500,000 in damages) in a libel action without requiring him to prove that the New York Times’s ad personally harmed him. Thus, the New York Times appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
§1.3.1 During the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, the New York Times published a full-page ad for contributing donations to defend Reverend Martin Kuther King Jr., who had been arrested on perjury charges. The ad, which was not fact checked before publication and contained some minor inaccuracies, alleged that the arrest of Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King’s efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage African Americans to vote. L.B. Sullivan, the elected Montgomery city commissioner, claimed that the statements referred to him because his duties included the supervision of the Montgomery police department. Sullivan requested that the New York Times publicly retract the information, which is a requirement for public figures to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. The New York Time refused to retract the ad, and were confused by Sullivan’s request since his name was never mentioned in the ad. Sullivan then filed a libel action against the New York Times and the four African American ministers who endorsed the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police personally defamed him. Under the libel action law in Alabama, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed. Thus, after proving that some statements in the ad contained factual errors, Sullivan was awarded $500,000 in damages. However, since the First Amendment states that to sustain a claim of defamation or libel the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew a statement was false/reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating if it was accurate (which Sullivan did not do, but was awarded damages anyways), the New York Times appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Alabama, claiming that Alabama’s libel law was a violation of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. The Court ruled in favor of the New York Times.
§1.4.1 First Amendment
§1.4.1.1 The Free Speech Clause is included in the First Amendment. This states that Congress shall pass no law that infringes upon the freedom of speech.
§1.4.2 Alabama Code Title 7, § 914.
§1.4.2.1 This denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply.
§1.4.4 The Sedition Act of 1798
§1.4.4.1 This states that it is illegal to write, print, utter, or publish any false, scandalous, and malicious writing with the intent to defame the government or to stir up sedition within the United States. This was passed by congress on July 14, 1798, and was set to expire on March 3, 1801.
§1.4.5 Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960)
§1.4.5.1 This case, released four years before the New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was about a man who sued the publishers of Jet magazine for stating that he had attacked a reverend with a hatchet and a pistol. The Court states that malice, actual or expressed, may be shown by evidence of hostility, rivalry, the violence of language, the mode and extent of publication, including the recklessness of the publication and prior information regarding its falsity.
§1.4.6 Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959)
§1.4.6.1 This case, published five years before the New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was about the deputy superintendent of police in Detroit who sued several newspapers for publishing a series of articles that claim he had engaged in fraud, corruption, and various other violations of the pubic trust. The Court held that a newspaper, when commenting upon the performance of duties by a public official, was invested with a qualified privilege.
§1.4.7 Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921)
§1.4.7.1 This case, published forty-three years before the New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was about the chief of police of Los Angeles who claims that a cartoon published in a Los Angeles newspaper was libelous and was intended to make him appear ridiculous and unfit for public office. The Court held that the publication must be both false and unprivileged in order to constitute actionable libel.
§1.5.1 The majority opinion states “Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is such an action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. While Alabama law apparently requires proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages, where general damages are concerned, malice is "presumed." Such a presumption is inconsistent with the federal rule.
§1.5.2 Since the “showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff” and the plaintiff did not prove actual malice from the New York Times. It cannot be assumed that there was any malice at all.
§1.5.3 Sullivan’s name was not in the ad, and he did not provide any proof of actual malice. Therefore, the New York Times’ ad was not libel and to rule it as such under Alabama law is unconstitutional and violates the rights guarantees by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
§1.6.1 Majority Opinion: The Court’s majority opinion was held by Justice Brennan, and was joined by Justice Warren, Justice Clark, Justice Harlan, Justice Stewart, and Justice White. In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan holds that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials, with the only exception being when statements are made with actual malice. Justice Brennan also holds that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Thus, for the press to be liable for libel, there must be proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages. Justice Brennan recognizes that Sullivan, the respondent, made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result of the alleged libel. Therefore, the Court’s majority opinion ruled in favor of the New York Times in a vote of 9-0 and reversed the $500,000 judgment.
§1.6.2 Concurring Opinion 1: The Court’s first concurring opinion was held by Justice Black and was joined by Justice Douglas. In the first concurring opinion, Justice Black agrees with the majority opinion’s reasoning that the actual malice standard didn’t go far enough in providing First Amendment protections, and that it was not clear enough to be consistently applied. Justice Black agrees with the Court’s holding that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct, but he feels that the Constitution should completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. Justice Black also recognizes that malice, even when defined by the court, is an elusive, abstract concept that is hard to prove and disprove. Therefore, Justice Black argues that the prior $500,000 judgment should be reserved exclusively on the ground that the New York Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the New York Times their criticism of the Montgomery agencies and elected officials.
§1.6.3 Concurring Opinion 2: The Court’s second concurring opinion was held by Justice Goldberg and was joined by Justice Douglas. In the second concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg also agrees with the Court’s majority opinion to reverse the prior $500,000 judgment. Justice Goldberg recognizes that a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion rules that the Constitution, through the First and Fourteenth Amendments, provide citizens and newspapers an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct of elected officials despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses.
§1.7.1 I think that the Court’s majority opinion was very rhetorically sound in its writing, particularly through how their argument is structured and their use of context. In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan starts off by describing who the respondent is, what his official elected position is, and what that particular position is responsible for. He then goes on to explain what the respondent claims is the alleged libel and includes what is said in the ad.
§1.7.1.1 I think this a very strategic move because right off the bat, we are introduced into who Sullivan is and what his actual position is as one of three city commissioners for Montgomery. It was also very strategic to show the entire contents of the ad, so that we can read it ourselves and understand the context of what is being construed as libel.
§1.7.2 After showing the sections of the ad that are the basis of Sullivan’s claim, Justice Brenna points out that there is no direct mention of Sullivan. Sullivan’s name is not in the ad at all, the ad never even says “city commissioner.” Justice Brennan then goes into everything that Sullivan claims. Sullivan “contended that the word ‘police; in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised the Police Department, so that he was being accused of ‘ringing’ the campus with police, and hence to him, the padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the students into submission. As to the sixth paragraph, he contended that, since arrests are ordinarily made by the police, the statement "They have arrested [Dr. King] seven times" would be read as referring to him; he further contended that the "They" who did the arresting would be equated with the "They" who committed the other described acts and with the "Southern violators." Thus, he argued, the paragraph would be read as accusing the Montgomery police, and hence him, of answering Dr. King's protests with "intimidation and violence," bombing his home, assaulting his person, and charging him with perjury. Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner.”
§1.7.2.1 I think this was very strategic. Justice Brennan shows us the article that never mentions Sullivan’s name. He then goes on to explain how Sullivan claims that “they’ refers to him. “They” could literally refer to anyone, and for that to be the basis of his argument with only seven people (one of which was Sullivan himself) to back him up out of the entire city of Montgomery is absurd.
§1.7.3 Justice Brennan then states that Sullivan made no effort prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result of this alleged libel.
§1.7.3.1 I think this was also strategic to note, because the Alabama Code Title 7, § 914 states that for a public official to recover punitive damages in a libel action on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. In that law, there is no mention of proving malice, which Sullivan did not do but was still awarded $500,000 because he proved that he asked for a retraction and was denied. However, this leads into Justice Brennan’s argument that it is unconstitutional to award damages in a libel case without proof of actual malice.
§1.7.4 In the majority opinion, there is discussion of the Sedition Act of 1798, Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960), Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959), and Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921).
§1.7.4.1 I think it was a strategic move to discuss these and include them in the court’s appendix because they provide precedents that were set years before this case even happened. Justice Brennan does discuss the Sedition Act of 1798 (See §1.4.4) which could have been used to help Sullivan’s case but it expired in 1801, so it couldn’t help. Whereas, Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So.2d 441, 450 (1960) (See §1.4.5) was decided on four years before this case and set a precedent that actual and expressed malice must be shown through evidence in a cases about publications with false information. Similarly, Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959) (See §1.4.6) was decided five years before this case and set a precedent that when the press (such as the New York Times) is commenting on the performances of public officials they have qualified privilege because they are elected officials and it is a matter of public concern. Also, Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (Cal. 1921) (See §1.4.7) was decided forty-three years before this case and it set a precedent that the publication must be both false and unprivileged in order to constitute actionable libel. All of these support the court’s majority opinion to rule in favor of the New York Times and reverse the $500,000 judgment due to Sullivan providing no evidence of pecuniary loss as a result of the alleged libel in this case.
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